INTRODUCTION
Since 2009, the business pages of many major newspapers have been rife with stories about insider trading. The name most often in the headline of these stories is Preet Bharara, U.S Attorney for the Southern District of New York.' Since taking on the job of fighting insider trading on a large scale, he boasts a 78-1 record for convictions.2 However, one man has evaded that scorecard even though his company and several employees have earned criminal and civil convictions.
S.A.C.
Capital Advisors, L.P. ("SAC") was once a $14-billion hedge fund with one of Wall Street's best records for performance. 3 Steven A. Cohen, the owner and namesake of SAC, was the subject of admiring profiles in everything from the New York Times 4 to Vanity Fair. 5 He was once number thirty-six on Forbes' list of richest Americans worth an approximated $11 billion; 6 Mr. Cohen was called "the king of hedge funds." 7 Mr. Cohen received attention for his art collection (valued at $1 billion) and his thirty-room mansion in Connecticut. 8 However, as his wealth and successes increased, there was attention building and many questioned, "How does he do it?" The two questions that swirled around SAC were: (1) How did the hedge fund outperform every other fund?; and (2) Why were so many current and former SAC traders being indicted, convicted, or entering guilty pleas for insider trading? As a result of these questions, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA") began making referrals to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") in 2010 for possible insider trading by SAC. In July 2013, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") filed a criminal indictment against SAC Capital. 9
I. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FIRM'S INDICTMENT
SAC lawyers originally entered a not guilty plea to the charges.o Employees and investors were sent an email saying that it would be business as usual for SAC's 1000 employees and its offices in eight cities around the world." Eventually, SAC's strategy would shift from complete denial to acceptance as the company agreed to plead guilty to settle criminal and civil charges.1 2 It is a rare move for federal prosecutors to indict a corporation, but as of mid-July 2013 (the time of the charges), SAC's main portfolio was up eleven percent when most hedge funds were nityfair.com/online/daily/2010/06/steve-cohen-on-life-love-his-art-collection-andthose-pesky-insider-trading-rumors.
6.
The As more individual traders from SAC began to face individual criminal convictions and details of the pervasive criminal corporate culture began to surface, it became clear the investigation into SAC would continue.
In November 2013, there was an announcement of the settlement of the SAC criminal charges.
14 The government outlined the terms. SAC agreed to pay $900 million in forfeiture and a $900 million fine.' 5 The firm received credit for a $616 million already paid to the SEC to settle civil charges, bringing the total fine to just under $1.2 billion.1 6 SAC, and by extension Mr. Cohen as the owner of the firm, agreed to pay the fine.' 7 However, Mr. Cohen was not charged criminally, and in statements released after the settlement, SAC pointed the finger at a small group of employees.' 8 He maintains that he bears no personal criminal responsibility.' 9 Mr. Cohen wisely seized on the weakness that the appellate court found in a previous case;20 that the government needs to show that Mr. Cohen actually knew that the information his traders and managers were using was nonpublic. Again, since the traders and managers gathered the information from different sources, including other brokers, traders, and managers, that direct line to nonpublic information is not easily established.
The case presents a series of unresolved legal questions about civil and criminal liability of financial firms, how the two types of cases are intertwined, and the role and culpability of firm leadership in these charges. Bharara has alleged that the company is a "magnet for market cheaters." 2 2 13. Goldstein, supra note 11. 14. Press Release, U.S. Dep't Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Guilty Plea Agreement With SAC Capital Management Companies (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attomey-announces-guilty-pleaagreement-sac-capital-management-companies. Is being a magnet for cheaters criminal activity? Can a culture that seems to breed insider trading be a basis for criminal charges? The case against SAC takes the firm's criminal culpability into uncharted waters.
15.
Exploration of this potential criminal culpability and culture will begin with a review of the history of SAC and Mr. Cohen with respect to interactions with regulators. A summary of the insider trading cases brought against former and current SAC employees will follow. Finally, there is analysis of how and when activities and knowledge can be attributed to firms for purposes of imposing criminal culpability and how this has left Mr. Cohen seemingly untouchable.
II. A HISTORY OF FRAUD: COHEN'S LEGAL AND REGULATORY

INTERACTIONS
Mr. Cohen first drew the attention of regulators early in his career. In 1991, as a young trader, Mr. Cohen was censured by the New York Stock Exchange and barred from trading for four weeks because he was alleged to have made a trade that inflated the price of a stock in order to protect him from losses.
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The result of the inflation trade was that his position loss was cut in half. Mr. Cohen was terminated because of the trade, and SAC was born. Questions arose surrounding SAC, Mr. Cohen, and insider trading long before the current criminal indictment of the corporation. For example, in 2003, Holly B. Becker, formerly of Lehman Brothers, was investigated by the SEC for passing along advance information to her then husband, who was a principal in SAC. 25 There were indications that the trading positions of Ms. Becker's husband coincided with the information he may have received through advance copies of the reports, however, no charges were ever filed.
26
Almost twenty years later, accusations still abounded. Mr. Cohen's former wife, Patricia Cohen, filed suit alleging that Mr. Cohen had made $20 million in profit by trading in advance of General Electric's ("GE") purchase of RCA Corporation based on an insider tip regarding the acquisition that he had received in advance of the GE announcement.
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The case was peripheral to the couple's divorce, and no charges were ever brought.
2 8 As these individual issues were percolating through innuendo, 
SAC CAPITAL
general questions about SAC continued to emerge in the business press. The "numbers" SAC achieved were labeled as "off the charts" and the compensation paid to SAC employees as "unmatchable," and those in the financial world sought to understand SAC's ability to defy market trends.
29
Interest into what was going on behind closed doors only continued to grow when individual former and current employees of the company began to be systematically indicted. 
B. Culture Factor Two: The Compliance Component
Until 2008, SAC had a policy of purging all instant messages ("IMs") after thirty-six hours and all emails not specifically saved after thirty days. The indictment specified, that although the compliance department had recommended reviewing electronic communications by employees, they were "rarely reviewed." 34 However, SAC later boasted that it had a thirtyeight employee compliance department, which was one of the "earliest, most sophisticated, most expensive, and most far-reaching in the industry." The claims by SAC in touting its compliance operations to investors was that those operations included the following:
'[D]aily reviews' of email and IMs; a 100% electronic retention policy; restrictions on the use of expert networks; and even surveillance of employee communications. It is true that most of these key compliance measures were instituted after the trades that are the focus of the indictments, but it also appears the were instituted before SAC became aware of the current investigation. The indictment alleged that, regardless of their relatively new compliance policies, it has become clear that the culture fostered by SAC produced "hundreds of millions of dollars of illegal profits and avoided losses at the expense of members of the investing public." 3 7 The issue is, however, does sloppy compliance equal scienter? The indictment falls short of tying the activities of the traders to Mr. Cohen thus attributing to him the knowledge of ongoing and uncorrected criminal activity that is required for executive and corporate criminal culpability. SAC not only tolerated cheating, it encouraged it. According to the FBI, the aim all along has been to root out the wrongdoers, and send a message to anyone else inclined to break the law. If your information 'edge' is inside information, you can't trade on it. 39 Ironically, Mr. Cohen said in a 2011 deposition that he found the law on 34. Indictment, supra note 9 para. 24. There is a "trail" of insider trading that surrounds SAC. Arguably, investigators just follow where the facts lead them, and many insider trading cases seem to lead back, in some way, to SAC through current or former employees.
42 This is evidence of the type of corporate culture fostered at SAC in which using questionable means to obtain an "edge" was commonplace.
The history of current and former SAC employees contains many who were accused, and convicted, of insider trading. Those who have been charged with insider trading with connections to SAC include Noah Freeman, Donald Longueuil, Jon Horvath, Wesley Wang, Mathew Martoma, Richard Choo-Beng Lee, and Michael Steinberg. 4 3 Mr. Martoma was found guilty on two counts of securities fraud and one count of conspiracy, and he was sent to prison for nine years. 44 Mr. Longueuil pleaded guilty but did not assist in the investigation. 45 Former portfolio manager, Mr. Lee, plead guilty to insider trading on July 23, 2013, and he is cooperating with the investigation as are Mr. 46 Freeman, Mr. Horvath, and Mr. Wang.
Among the traders Mr. Lee implicated was Richard Grodin who worked for SAC in the 1990s, and he was able to provide the FBI with information about the culture of the company, including the extensive use of expert networks. 47 Bharara has described the analysts and portfolio managers as maintaining a "tight-knit circle of greed." 4 8 40. Stewart, supra note 32.
41.
Id. There are times when traders go south because of the culture of a firm, but there are other times when traders have already gone south, and they are hired precisely because of their sordid past. For example, one of the young traders hired at SAC was Richard S. Lee, a 34-year-old trader who was hired from Citadel, a Chicago-based hedge fund.
See
Mr. Lee was fired after one day on the job at Citadel because he signed onto the company's accounting system and altered the value of his holdings by $4.5 million. 54 Citadel's accounting system caught the problem, and he was terminated. Ordinarily, this type of behavior by a trader would mean the end of a trader's career. No financial firm would want to risk having such an individual anywhere near client's funds or its accounting systems. SAC, on the other hand, was more than willing to hire someone whose career was over by market standards. Despite warnings from both Citadel (whose CEO had approved Lee's termination), as well as warning from SAC's own legal team about the compliance risks of bringing Mr. Lee into the firm, Mr. Lee was hired.
5 Mr. Lee has disclosed that he emphasized his reliance on expert networks in doing his job during his subsequent 
56.
Id.
interview with SAC. Mr. Lee was indicted for insider trading, has entered a guilty plea, and has cooperated with the government on the SAC case. Mr. Lee has indicated that federal authorities have sought his cooperation by asking for information about the questions asked and statements made during his hiring process. 59 When SAC was asked for information about its hiring processes, it responded by indicating that it does not take the hiring process lightly and that it has refused to hire some individuals because of concerns about "compliance issues.,, 60 However, SAC has declined to give any examples of its refusal to hire someone 61 because of compliance concerns.
Insider trading cases against six former SAC employees have shed light on the expectations that came through the hiring process. Noah Freeman, shortly after graduating from Harvard, joined SAC and has told the FBI "that trafficking in corporate secrets was part of his job description at SAC." 62 An FBI agent's notes on SAC include the following, "Freeman and others at SAC Capital understood that providing Cohen with your best trading ideas involved providing Cohen with inside information." 63 Bharara noted that the "indictment is not just a narrative of names and numbers, it is more broadly an account of a firm with zero tolerance for low returns but seemingly tremendous tolerance for questionable conduct." 64 E-mails within SAC emphasize some interesting credentials of new hires, including items such as the fact that a trader owned a share of a house in the Hamptons with one company's CEO or that another was "tight with management" of another company.
6 5 Education, former employers, and achievements are generally the focus of circulated information about new employees.
However, at SAC, connections were touted as qualifications for the job.
VI. TESTING THE EVIDENCE: THE CONVICTION OF MICHAEL STEINBERG 66
Michael Steinberg was one of SAC's most senior portfolio managers. Mr. Horvath explained that he took this as a push to go out and seek nonpublic information.
70
A jury convicted Mr. Steinberg in December 2013 of conspiracy and securities fraud. 71 He was found guilty of five counts related to illegal tips on technology stocks provided by Mr. Horvath to bring in $1.4 million in illegal profits to SAC. 72 This was the first case in which federal prosecutors attempted to convince a jury in a criminal proceeding that there was enough evidence to prove insider trading at SAC. 73 Mr. Steinberg appeared to briefly faint after being convicted. It could be inferred that Mr. Martoma directly discussed this inside information with Mr. Cohen during a twenty-minute phone conversation based on the fact that SAC began purging its holdings in the companies associated with the drug a day after the conversation took place. 82 The indictment alleges that Mr. Cohen encouraged Mr. Martoma to speak with the doctor running the clinical trials and took no action to determine whether the employees under his supervision were engaged in unlawful conduct. Mr. Martoma was drawn to SAC originally by a guarantee of specific profits from his own portfolio and a portion of proceeds in the Cohen and CR Intrinsic accounts.
86
This compensation package was a direct pathway to money that no other hedge fund was offering.
Mr. Martoma had a biology degree from Duke. He had work experience at the National Human Genome Research Institute, and he is married to a physician. 88 This background is what may have drawn him to pharmaceutical stocks. 89 The year of the big pharmaceutical trade, Mr. Martoma was rewarded for his suspicious conduct with a $9.3 million bonus. 90 In 2009 and 2010, Mr.
Martoma did not receive a bonus. has been a common occurrence on Wall Street.
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The Former Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") of Enron, Andrew Fastow, received a more lenient sentence in exchange for testifying against his superiors. Recent insider trading cases featured similar exchanges with Anil Kumar testifying against the Galleon Group Founder, Raj Rajaratnam, and Goldman Sachs Board Member, Rajat Gupta. 98 These cooperators plead guilty and avoided trial in their exchange for a lesser sentence. 9 9 The odds of Mr. Martoma providing prosecutors with information regarding Mr. Cohen may now be diminished because of the conviction, which may result in a reduced incentive to cooperate.
As noted, Mr. Martoma was sentenced in September of 2014.100 Probation officials recommended eight years, while the federal sentencing guidelines suggested somewhere between 15.6 and 19.7 years, the sentence was for nine years.' 0 ' Mr. Martoma's lawyers asked for a more lenient sentence considering his devotion to his family, his 100 support letters, and his history of helping others.1 02 The judge went with the lesser figure for what appeared to be consideration for his family. The value of his testimony has also already been significantly diminished by facts that came out in his own criminal trial. Convictions on counts of fraud and conspiracy do not bolster his credibility.'o In the course of his trial, it also became apparent that he was expelled from Harvard Law School for falsifying his transcript when he applied for a clerkship with a federal judge.' 0 6
The end result was that the two SAC employees with direct contact to Mr. Cohen, Mr. Martoma and Mr. Steinberg, refused to cooperate with the government. 0 7 Business journalist Robert Boxwell noted, "to police Wall Street, go after the little guys."' 0 8
The hope was that the "little guys" would sing, but there is a loyalty here that finds the little guys falling on their swords for the big fish.
The recent decision on insider trading will only increase this trend. The decision has muddied the waters on scienter and put in place a standard that requires a direct connection to an insider in order to establish criminal securities fraud.
The research networks that resulted in so many indictments, pleas, and convictions are now a gray area of the law. Second-hand information is not the stuff of insider trading. In Mr. Martoma's case, even when the direct connection is established to the physician/scientist, the trader was unwilling to implicate principals in the firm in exchange for a lesser sentence. "the action of an agent, while exercising the authority delegated to him to make rates for transportation may be controlled in the interest of public policy by imputing his act to his employer and imposing penalties upon the corporation for which he is acting in the premises." 1 1 ' After discussing the collective entity doctrine, Bharara concluded that "the corporation is particularly ill equipped to defend itself, and certainly less well equipped than the traditional individual defendant, against the power of prosecutors to prove virtually any corporate entity guilty upon showing criminal conduct on the part of at least one employee.""12 Bharara argued that there is a need to address overbroad corporate liability standards." 3 In this case, a federal judge admonished the government for coercing a company to interfere with its employee's constitutional rights.11 4 The conduct was criticized because it allowed prosecutors to use unjustifiably heavy-handed techniques to compel corporations to cooperate in criminal investigations against their own employees." 5 Bharara noted that corporations do not have the same ability to challenge various information gathering techniques by the government. Perhaps, it is the balance between long held beliefs in corporate liability and prosecutorial discretion that prompted Bharara to pursue criminal charges against SAC but not against Mr. Cohen. It is possible that with a codified rule or statute, Mr. Cohen could have been charged, as less discretion would lie in the hands of the prosecution.
X. THE DIFFICULTY IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION UNDER INSIDER TRADING
LAWS
The framework set out in Dirks v. SEC governs insider-trading offences.1 23 Under this framework set out by the U.S. Supreme Court, a tippee is liable for insider trading if the tipper conveys nonpublic information to him and improperly breaches a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty of trust and confidence to the shareholder. Liability will attach when a tipper breaches his/her fiduciary duty by providing material nonpublic information leading to the conclusion that the tippee knew, or should have known, of the breach. There are allegations that Mr. Cohen received nonpublic information from those at his firm who have already been indicted.126 The caveat is that only those insiders who were in the actual possession of the improperly obtained information when they made insider trades are liable, and the facts in the media do not indicate that Cohen was an a "actual or constructive insider of the firms about which the information as received."l 2 7 One potential solution to bring Cohen under some form of criminal liability would be that he is a possible insider trading tippee, one who controlled and financed the insider traders. make the trades. The difficulty in connecting him is exacerbated by the fact that others did the trading, and he basically congratulated them for a good call. For the breach of duty component of an insider trading action, the prosecutor would have to establish that the tipper had a duty of trust which included a duty not to disclose any material nonpublic information and not engage in insider trading, that he or she breached this duty, that the tippee knew that there was a duty, and that the tippee knew that the duty was breached by supplying that information.1 2 9 With Mr. Cohen, it is not clear that Mr. Martoma and others were sharing with him how they got their information.
Under this framework, Mr. Martoma's case is instructive. If Mr. Cohen knew, or should have known (based on prior experiences with Mr. Martoma and his conduct), the origin of the information regarding the Alzheimer's clinical trials, culpability could be established. It is again difficult to establish that Mr. Cohen was aware that the people who shared information with Mr. Cohen's employees breached duties of trust by sharing information. From the information of the employees outlined above, it is unlikely that Mr. Cohen had actual knowledge of any informant's duty or breach. The issue becomes one of whether turning a blind eye and denying constructive knowledge is the intent of these insider trading provisions. The effect of the recent interpretation is that principals and executives in a firm can stand back and witness phenomenal avoidance of losses and spectacular gains with public events following shortly thereafter and be able to claim no knowledge of direct inside information. At some point, the duty of inquiry arises, and the culture issues play a part in establishing knowledge.
In SEC v. Obus, the court held that an analysis of what a tippee should have known involves "a fact specific inquiry turning on the tippee's own knowledge and sophistication, and on whether the tipper's conduct raised red flags that confidential information was being transmitted improperly."o 30 The court in United States v. Whitman noted that a remote tippee's knowledge that the tipper was receiving some sort of benefit might be difficult to prove.' 3 1 The court aptly .said that this "'loophole,' is a product of the topsy-turvy like way the law of insider trading has developed in the courts and cannot be cured short of legislation." In reality, the manner in which securities laws are framed allows "aware" traders to set up an operation in which they shield themselves from liability. They can pay their fines, pay their employees' legal fees, and still have a corporation left to manage their personal fortune. This appears to be what has happened with SAC and Mr. Cohen.
13 3 Under this standard, the congratulatory emails, such as those between Mr. Horvath and Mr. Cohen on the Dell deal (for which he avoided $1.7 million in losses) and the information provided by Mr. Martoma on the medical insider information, show an awareness of phenomenal trades but not necessarily an awareness of the sources of information used to make the market moves.1 34 XI. THE FUTURE OF SAC CAPITAL As a result of the criminal settlement, SAC must cease its investment advisor functions and will not be investing public money; instead, it is left investing Mr. Cohen's large personal fortune under the name Point72 Asset Management.' 3 1 In March 2014, the SAC website disappeared from the Internet, and in its place was a page for Point72 Asset Management.'
36 A disclaimer at the bottom of the new web page reminds visitors "Point72 Asset Management does not seek, solicit, or accept clients that are not eligible as family clients." 3 Even if the SEC bans Mr. Cohen from the securities industry, it will not impact his ability to trade his personal fortune. ("U.S. prosecutors have concluded that they don't have enough evidence against hedge-fund billionaire Steven A. Cohen to file criminal insider-trading charges against him before a July deadline.").
134. Indictment, supra note 9, para. 32a. In reality, the $1.2 billion settlement is less than the $1.3 billion Mr. Cohen personally made last year. 14 0 Mr. Cohen's net worth was recently reported at $9.4 billion, and it now appears that he will be left with a sizable $7 billion fortune.1 4 1
Selena Maranjian, See What This Infamous Money Manager Has Sold, THE
Mr. Cohen will personally pay for the fine even though he still denies personal wrongdoing.142 He privately complained that he had to pay over $1 billion in fines for the actions of what he calls "rogue employees."l 43 A press release issued after the settlement by SAC read "[t]he tiny fraction of wrongdoers does not represent the 3,000 honest men and women who have worked at the firm during the past 21 years. SAC has never encouraged, promoted or tolerated insider trading." 44 This statement angered federal prosecutors because it conflicted with SAC's admission of guilt. SAC offered a new statement that read. "Even one person crossing the line into illegal behavior is too many and we greatly regret this conduct occurred."l 4 5
A. Future Prosecution of Mr. Cohen
The door has not been shut to future prosecution of Mr. Cohen and others as Bharara stated in the settlement agreement that the "agreement today provides no immunity from prosecution for any individual. In 2013, there was speculation that prosecutors were considering the possibility of racketeering charges, which carry lengthy prison sentences.
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Decades ago, in New York, when Rudy Giuliani held Bharara's position, he brought racketeering charges against Princeton/Newport Limited Partners. 
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criminally charged and found guilty of insider trading. 158 It has been speculated that the worst possible outcome of this civil charge would be a lifetime ban from the securities business. 159 Because this action was filed through an administrative proceeding, it will limit Mr. Cohen's right to discovery.
0
There is some speculation that this was done to limit Mr. Cohen's ability to prepare a better defense in any future criminal case.
1
The choice, in proceeding through administrative action, also affords the case a lower burden of proof than a criminal case, providing for a potential 162 warm-up.
In the Order, Instituting Administrative Proceedings, the SEC alleges, "Cohen received highly suspicious information that should have caused any reasonable hedge fund manager in Cohen's position to take prompt action to determine whether employees under his supervision were engaged in unlawful conduct and prevent violations of federal securities law."l 6 3
Mr. Cohen appears to have taken the lesson to heart or at least to the point of prevention. He has been seeking to hire former prosecutors and others with government experience for the compliance function in his new firm.1 64 Several FBI agents have already been hired.
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C. Shifting Prosecution Priorities
There have been shifting political winds and public pressures surrounding the manner and frequency with which the DOJ charges and prosecutes corporate defendants.
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The DOJ received a great deal of public scrutiny for its failure to bring criminal charges against any financial institutions for their role in the 2008 financial crisis, which only intensified in the wake of their decision to pursue a deferred prosecution agreement The willful ignorance defense has taken a beating beyond SOX because the "who knew" defense has the same effect on the corporation or organization as the loss of credibility in financial statements-trust is dissipated. 187 The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine ("RCOD") imposes risk on those who manage corporations through the imposition of criminal liability on them for conduct that harms or endangers the public."' This form of criminal liability for officers and directors results without proof of knowledge, recklessness, or intent, the three usual foundations for criminal responsibility. Initially, the RCOD was applied only in the health care sector, but it has now expanded to all areas of law where the purpose of the violated statute is public welfare.' 89 For example, environmental protections, food safety, and industrial safety are all areas where there is corporate officer accountability.
1 90 Although much of the attention and concern regarding the RCOD focuses on the health care sector, the doctrine may also be used to enforce other public welfare statutes. Incarceration is rarely sought in Canada, and prosecution is more likely the option for the administrative tribunal set up by the Ontario Securities Commission. 98 This difference in treatment comes from a stark difference in the law. The OSC has a public interest jurisdiction.1 99 Insider trading requires the accused to be in a special relationship with the company whose shares are purchased or sold, and the accused must have knowledge of a material fact or change about the firm that has not been generally disclosed 2 00 whereas, in the United States, an accused is required to plead to breaching a specific Canada only entered its first criminal conviction for illegal insider trading on November 6, 2009, accepting a guilty plea from Stan Grmovsek.
20 2 He and his co-accused started an illegal trading scheme after their graduation from law school in 1994. 203 He took nonpublic information and made trades for a profit. 204 As Emily Cole reports, In Canada, Grmovsek was charged with three offences: 2 10 Some note that many wealthy clients seek art loans because they can keep the paintings at their homes while "borrowing at rates as low as 2.5 percent." 2 1 1 Many agree that Mr. Cohen had nominal punishments for the alleged infractions he has been a part of. He continues to invest his personal fortune, and he continues to engage in the very public promotion of his private fortune.
As Joan MacLeod Heminway concludes in her article on SAC, perhaps this case is the reason to open the discussion on insider trading and what, "the law of insider trading should be-and why-as a matter of policy. If insider trading regulation and liability is to have any coherence in an era of expert networks, we must address and resolve this question."
212 If the classic goals of the criminal law are for deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, and incapacitation, then it is questionable if some, or any of 211 these goals, have been achieved in this situation.
Mr. Cohen is not personally suffering any of these consequences, and some would say that he is flaunting his good fortune which remains largely intact.
2 14 Although Mr. Cohen cannot invest public money, he has been keeping busy with his private fortune.
Some have said that the charges against SAC were merely a result of the inability of the government to collect enough evidence against Mr. Cohen himself. 215 However, destroying SAC might be the only way to attempt to punish Mr. Cohen. In August of 2013, the last outside investor of SAC pulled his support. 2 16 Ed Butowsky, the self-appointed "last man standing"
with SAC, defended the company by noting "the government says SAC has a culture of insider trading. What about a culture of working-my-a** off? Because that's what they're doing at SAC." 217 Questions still abound about the culture of SAC, but the law, as it existed at the time of the prosecutions and settlement, did not allow conviction based on culture. The law still requires that direct nexus of insider to defendant in order to prove the scienter element of insider trading.
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As with the SOX reforms that held CEOs and CFOs accountable through their signatures on the financial statements, perhaps the time has arrived for legislative action that requires CEO certification of compliance operations. In other words, until there is some additional statutory supplement, insidertrading convictions of corporations and CEOs will be elusive, absent the cooperation, taping, and wire-tapping of subordinates. Accountability for firm actions needs to be addressed in a manner not reliant upon the specific proof requirements of insider trading.
Certification could include requirements for examination of the timing of trading, periodic reviews of traders' accounts, and that supposed element of "serendipity" that seems to be tolerated in a world of logarithms, betas, and all things technical. That certification of review may be the answer to the insider trading escape clause that allows those who profit to walk away without criminal charges because, well, they knew nothing. The legislative approach should be one of tackling: Should they have known? And how can we measure that? If not, perhaps Mr. Cohen is the king of eluding criminal conviction, not just the king of hedge funds.
/08/28/sac-loses-one-of-its-most-loyal-investors/. 
